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RES GESTAE, THE PRESENT SENSE
IMPRESSION EXCEPTION AND EXTRINSIC
CORROBORATION UNDER FEDERAL
RULE OF EVIDENCE 803(1) AND
ITS STATE COUNTERPARTS
I. Introduction
The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule is being
robbed of its utility. The exception is burdened with an unnecessary
additional requirement of extrinsic corroboration. Res gestae,1 a term
regarded with disdain by many evidence scholars,2 may present a so-
lution to this difficult problem which arises in the application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and its state analogues. The disdain sur-
rounding res gestae is due primarily to its vague and inaccurate us-
age.3 Federal Rules of Evidence 803(l),' (2), s and (3)6 share a
1. Res gestae was defined over 100 years ago in the following manner:
Whatever act, or series of acts, constitute, or in point of time immediately ac-
company and terminate in, the principal act charged... from its inception to its
consummation or final completion, or its prevention or abandonment ... and
whatever may be said by either of the parties during the continuance of the
transaction, with reference to it ... form part of the principle transaction and
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae.
Thayer, Bedingfield's Case-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta, 14 AM. L. REv. 817,
822-23 (1881). The important characteristic of res gestae, for the purposes of this Note, is
the immediacy and close proximity of the declaration to the principal event or condition.
For a modern definition of res gestae see infra note 36.
2. "A term that cannot be defined should be dropped." Thayer, supra note 1, at 827;
see also Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31
YALE L.J. 229, 231 (1922) [hereinafter Morgan]; E. FISCH, FISCH ON NEW YORK Evi-
DENCE § 1003, at 583-84 (1977) [hereinafter FISCH]. The term has been described as not
only "entirely useless, but even positively harmful." 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1767, at
255 (Chadbourne rev. 1976) [hereinafter WIGMORE].
3. Morgan, supra note 2, at 229.
4. The present sense impression exception is reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence
803(1): "The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness: Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an
event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter." FED. R. EvID. 803(1).
5. Rule 803(2) provides the following pertinent provision: "Excited Utterance. A
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under
the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
6. Declarations of present mental states and bodily conditions are covered in Rule
803(3):
Then existing mental emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condi-
tion (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
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common theoretical root, as all three evolved from the ancient doc-
trine of res gestae. Thus, uniform standards of corroboration and ex-
trinsic proof should be applied to all three rules.' Such consistency
would improve and simplify the way courts apply the most trouble-
some of these three sibling hearsay exceptions-the present sense im-
pression exception of Rule 803(l).1
This Note proposes that the present sense impression exception
should be treated uniformly with its two companion rules. This is not
to suggest a single standard for the admissibility of the hearsay excep-
tions that arose from the doctrine of res gestae. Rather, these hearsay
exceptions in general, and the present sense impression exception in
particular, should be applied as codified in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Unless there is a substantial showing that additional require-
ments for admissibility are required, 9 such additional requirements
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identifica-
tion, or terms of the declarant's will.
FED. R. EvID. 803(3). Rule 803(3) is a special case ofRule 803(l) and was designed to
restrict it. FED. R. EvID. 803(3) advisory committee's note 4. The aspects of 803(3) re-
garding execution of a will are beyond the scope of this Note.
7. All three of the hearsay exceptions discussed are based on res gestae and have
similar justifications for admission in spite of the rule against hearsay. C. MCCORMICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 288, at 836 (Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCOR-
MICK]. Treating these exceptions uniformly avoids "repugnancies between the reasoning
upon which one exception is founded and that by which another is justified .... " Mor-
gan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REV. 1, 19 (1937) (discussing hearsay exceptions in
general) [hereinafter Hearsay Rule]. See, e.g., infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the incongruities between rules 803(1) and 803(2).
8. Id.; see also infra notes 58-63 for a discussion of some of the difficulties in apply-
ing Rule 803(1).
9. One such instance, where an additional requirement of extrinsic corroboration is
reasonable, is the so-called Hillmon II statement. A Hillmon II statement is a statement
of intent which not only reflects the state of mind of the declarant (used inferentially to
prove future conduct in harmony with that state of mind, see infra note 140) but also
purports to show the state of mind of another, which might be used inferentially to prove
conduct consistent with that state of mind. This is clearly distinct from the Hillmon
doctrine, because this statement of intention requires the actions of others if it is to be
fulfilled. See, e.g., United States v. Astorga-Torres, 682 F.2d 1331, 1335-36, 1336 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108 (1983) (statement of defendant that he intended to
bring guards with him admitted subject to limiting instruction that statement be used to
show defendant's state of mind and not that of supposed guards); United States v.
Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 376-80 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977) (wit-
ness' statement, "I am going to meet Angelo in the parking lot to get a pound of grass,"
admitted to prove meeting occurred). The Pheaster court noted that the Federal Rules of
Evidence incorporated a limitation that the statement only be admitted to prove the de-
clarant's conduct and not the conduct of another. Id. at 379. The Second Circuit has
adopted the view that Hillmon II statements may be admitted against a non-declarant
when there is independent evidence connecting the statement and the activities of the
non-declarant. United States v. Delvecchio, 816 F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1987). In
Delvecchio, there was no independent evidence of the non-declarant's presence at the
1989] RES GESTAE
should be abandoned. This argument is based on the rationale that
the Rule 803(1) present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule
carries with it substantial reliability' ° and therefore should be ac-
corded uniform treatment with Rules 803(2) and (3). Part II of this
Note presents an overview of the hearsay rule and its general histori-
cal development, as well as background on the history of the res gestae
doctrine to provide a clearer understanding of the Federal Rules dis-
cussed. Part III examines the current analysis of these three Rule 803
hearsay exceptions, and compares the requirements of external cor-
roboration of hearsay statements under each of Rules 803(1), (2) and
(3) to illustrate some inconsistencies in the application of these rules.
Part III concludes that it is essential that a concise and historically
consistent method of applying the present sense impression exception
be used, and suggests an approach that harmonizes Federal Rules
803(1), (2) and (3), without adding'an additional requirement of
corroboration.
II. History of the Hearsay Rule and Res Gestae
The historical evolution of the hearsay exclusionary rule, and of the
resulting exceptions to the rule, has had an influence on the manner in
which hearsay exceptions are applied today.1 '
A. Development of the Hearsay Rule
Hearsay evidence 2 is generally excluded because out of court state-
meeting. Thus, the declarant's statement. should have been excluded. Id. at 863. Where
such independent evidence is available, Hillmon H statements are admitted. United States
v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1243 (1984) (eyewitness
testimony of Drug Enforcement Agency agents linked defendant's conduct to the declar-
ant's statement). This additional requirement of extrinsic corroboration seems reason-
able. One of the primary reasons for considering Hillmon statements reliable enough to
admit over the hearsay rule is the unique perception the declarant has of her own state of
mind. This element is wholly lacking in attempting to divine the intentions of another.
See infra note 144.
10. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 253, at 753.
11. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
12. The hearsay rule declares inadmissible as evidence any statement other than that
made by a witness while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c). The "statement" can be oral,
written, or even non-verbal conduct if intended as an assertion. FED. R. EvID. 801(a).
The "declarant" is the person who makes the statement. FED. R. EvID. 801(b). The
rationale for the rule against admitting hearsay evidence is that the credibility of the
witness is a critical factor in weighing the truth of his statement. When the statement is
made out of court, without the usual benefit of cross-examination and without the wit-
ness's demeanor being subject to evaluation by the trier of fact, it does not bear the requi-
site indicia of veracity. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1766, at 250-52. McCormick notes:
"A definition cannot, in a sentence or two, furnish ready answers to all the complex
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ments are believed to lack reliability.'" Credibility of hearsay testi-
mony, as of all testimony, depends upon a witness' perception,
memory, narration and sincerity. 14 The rule against admitting hear-
say evidence is designed to ensure compliance with the "traditional
guarantors of credibility."' 5 These guarantors are the taking of an
oath, the witness' personal presence at trial, and submission of the
witness to cross-examination.' 6
The hearsay exclusionary rule is ancient, and probably owes its
emergence to the development of the jury system.' 7 Testimony in
court was permitted only by witnesses who had personal knowledge
problems of an extensive field, such as hearsay. It can, however, furnish a helpful general
focus and point of beginning." MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 246, at 729. McCormick
then uses Rules 801(a)-(c) as his starting point. A standard definition is provided in the
following:
[Hearsay is] [e]vidence not proceeaing from the personal knowledge of the wit-
ness, but from the mere repetition of what he has heard others say. That which
does not derive its value solely from the credit of the witness, but rests mainly
on the veracity and competency of other persons. The very nature of the evi-
dence shows its weakness, and it is admitted only in specified cases from
necessity.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 649 (5th ed. 1979).
13. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 245, at 726-29. McCormick states that the out-
of-court statement is not subject to the "ideal conditions" to which in-court testimony is
subject. See infra note 15. "As the utterer is not under oath and is not subject to cross
examination, his testimony is ordinarily deemed too untrustworthy to be received." Mor-
gan, supra note 2, at 23 1. Distinct from constitutional considerations there are three
reasons to exclude hearsay evidence as unreliable. See infra note 29. First, the declarant
cannot be cross-examined on the verity of his statement. Second, the declarant's state-
ment was not made under oath or threat of perjury sanctions. Finally, the demeanor of
the declarant is hidden from the trier of fact. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 245, at 727-
28.
14. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 245, at 726. These factors influence all testimony:
(1) Perception: Did the witness perceive the event and perceive it accurately? (2) Memory:
Has the witness' memory altered his impression of his perception? (3) Narration: Does
the witness' language convey his impression accurately? (4) Sincerity: Is the witness con-
sciously misrepresenting his perception of the event? Id.; see Tribe, Triangulating Hear-
say, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1974) [hereinafter Tribe]. In order to minimize the
deleterious effect of these factors upon testimony, Anglo-American courts developed
three guarantors-oath, personal presence at trial, and cross-examination. MCCORMICK,
supra note 7, § 245, at 726-27.
15. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 245, at 726-27. These guarantors are oath, personal
presence at trial, and cross-examination. The oath or affirmation is "calculated to
awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to [testify truthfully]." FED.
R. EVID. 603. Personal presence at trial allows in-court observation of the declarant's
demeanor, and protects against errors in the reporting of her out of court statement.
MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 245, at 727. Cross-examination is the main justification for
the exclusion of hearsay. Id. at 728. Cross-examination is "beyond any doubt the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1367,
at 32.
16. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 245, at 726-28.
17. See, e.g., 5 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1364, at 12-14. Morgan, however, chose to
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of the facts about which they were testifying, and not by witnesses
who merely recounted what others had told them."8 Originally, the
jury was really nothing more than a collection of state-appointed wit-
nesses who passed judgment on the accused.' 9 Today, the functions
of the jury and witnesses are separate, and the split between the func-
tions of the jury and witnesses led to a strict hearsay rule.2" It became
necessary to ensure that testimony, which the jury would weigh as the
finder of fact, bore at least minimal reliability.2' As soon as the rule
excluding hearsay developed,22 however, it was clear that not all evi-
dence that could conceivably be called "hearsay" should be ex-
cluded.23  Accordingly, numerous exceptions to the hearsay
exclusionary rule evolved.24 The modern trend is to be "less afraid"
view the hearsay rule as a product of the adversarial system. Morgan, The Jury and the
Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 257-58 (1937).
18. J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 519 (1898). Testimony was
only permitted by witnesses with knowledge of the underlying event and "not by wit-
nesses who only knew what some one else had said to them." Id.
19. Id. at 19-21.
20. Id. at 519. "The contrast between the function of the jury and that of witnesses
... has led to a steady and rigid adherence to this general doctrine of hearsay prohibi-
tion." Id.
21. See id. at 85-101. Hearsay testimony was disparaged as "a story out of another
man's mouth" and as a "tale of a tale." 5 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1364, at 19 n.32.
Cross-examination would allow the trier of fact to examine the witness' memory, percep-
tion, narration, and sincerity. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 245, at 726-27.
22. The rule against hearsay became part of the English common law in the late sev-
enteenth century. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1364, at 25.
23. THAYER, supra note 18 at 519-20. "But there came a large and miscellaneous
number of so-called 'exceptions.'. .. For example... dying declarations of persons killed
were reported and acted on in judicial proceedings. We find these used by a complaint
witness as far back as 1202, and used in evidence to the jury in 1721." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
24. Id; see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(24). The exceptions share two common re-
quirements: necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity in the case of the 803 exceptions
lies in the fact that the hearsay statement is likely to be more reliable than the declarant's
testimony. Trustworthiness is supplied by the circumstances under which the hearsay
statement was made, and serves as a substitute for cross-examination. Hearsay Rule,
supra note 7 at 11-12; FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee notes. Courts and com-
mentators have argued that the hearsay rule should be relaxed. "The exceptions are not
... static, but may be enlarged from time to time if there is no material departure from
the reason of the general [hearsay] rule." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107
(1934) (citations omitted). The modern trend is to ignore labels such as "present sense
impression," and concentrate on two factors that underlie most exceptions to the hearsay
rule: (1) the necessity of accepting hearsay testimony rather than direct testimony subject
to cross-examination; and (2) the circumstantial probability of the trustworthiness of the
hearsay statement. Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 972 n.5 (4th Cir. 1971)
(discussing excited utterance exception); see Morgan, The Hearsay Dangers and the Appli-
cation of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 218 (1948). Morgan cynically
noted that "it is a bit difficult to explain to a layman why [hearsay exceptions function so
strangely] [b]ut laymen are so dumb anyway!" Hearsay Rule, supra note 7 at 16; Tribe,
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of a jury's ability to weigh evidence properly than in the past,25 and to
strike a balance between the probative value of the evidence and its
possible prejudicial effect on the jury.26
Exceptions to the hearsay rule developed as soon as the rule itself
did," but Rule 80328 hearsay exception cases may implicate impor-
tant constitutional rights quite apart from any strictly evidentiary
considerations.29 The most important of these constitutional rights is
supra note 14, at 974 (suggesting more flexible approach to hearsay rules and that hearsay
categories be used as illustrations only). Others have maintained that existing hearsay
exceptions be narrowed. See e.g., Waltz, Present Sense Impressions and the Residual Ex-
ceptions: A New Day for "Great" Hearsay?, 2 LITIGATION 22 (1975) (calling for addi-
tional requirements for admission of evidence under the "sleeper exception" of Rule
803(1)) [hereinafter Waltz I].
25. Thayer, Bedingfield's case-Declarations as a Part of Res Gesta, 15 AM. L. REV.
71 at 91 [hereinafter Thayer]. These sentiments were present even in the "modem"
1880's:
Judges are, in general, less afraid of juries now than they used to be; one is
reminded ... of ... Reg. v. Birmingham, 1 B. & S. 763 (1861) : 'People were
formerly frightened out of their wits about admitting evidence, lest juries should
go wrong. In modern times we admit the evidence and discuss its weight.'
Id. (footnote omitted).
26. See FED. R. EVID. 403 & advisory committee's note.
27. Hearsay Rule, supra note 7, at 11-12. The initial exceptions, however, were not
arrived at in a coherent manner.
[T]here never has been a time when all hearsay was rejected; and it is difficult to
tell upon what basis the courts proceeded, when they began to discriminate
between that which should be received and that which should be excluded. The
early opinions reveal very little except that the judges were not doing much
more than applying their own rough notions of psychology, and the generally
accepted idea that litigants should produce the best available evidence....
The assertion is ventured that the hearsay rule in its present form is the result
of a conglomeration of conflicting considerations modified by historical
accident.
Id.
28. The title of Rule 803 indicates that the "[a]vailability of [the] [d]eclarant [is]
[i]mmaterial." This admissibility requirement is important both at the evidentiary level
and the constitutional level. FED. R. EvID. 803; see infra note 29.
29. Hearsay evidence may offend a criminal defendant's constitutional right of con-
frontation. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. ... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment is made
binding on the states by the fourteenth amendment. States may not deny this right.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). By its very nature, hearsay testimony may not
allow the accused to confront the declarant. As hearsay testimony is, by definition, testi-
mony outside the present proceeding, the right of the accused to confront the witness
against him is implicated. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 252, at 749-52.
The right of confrontation operates in four crucial ways which parallel the reasons
cited regarding the admissibility of hearsay testimony. See supra note 15. Indeed, they
have similar underpinnings. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 252, at 750-52. First, it ensures
that the accused has a proper opportunity for effective cross-examination. California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406-07. It allows the accused to
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a criminal defendant's right of confrontation.3" This countervailing
consideration supports a narrow construction of the present sense im-
pression exception in certain cases. 31 Other than these crucial consti-
tutional concerns, under the categorical approach of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, relevance, 32 probative value33 and personal knowl-
edge34 are the guideposts to admissibility of evidence.35
probe the motivations of the witness and discover inconsistencies. Cross-examination is
"an inviolable, indispensable element of confrontation." Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185,
188 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), ajfd, 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tx. Sup. Ct. 1986), cert. denied,108 S.
Ct. 1301 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). The cross-examiner
is permitted to test the witness' story, veracity, perceptions and memory. United States v.
Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979). Denial of this right to test a witness before
the triers of fact would be "constitutional error of the first magnitude." Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (quoting Brookhart v. Javis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966)). Second, the
right of confrontation ensures testimony under oath, impresses the witness with the seri-
ousness of the matter and guards against perjury. Green, 399 U.S. at 158. Third, it is the
literal right to confront an adverse witness face to face that forms the core of this sixth
amendment right. The accused should be given the opportunity to react to testimony
produced against him. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895). Fourth, the
right enables the jury to observe the subtle nuances of the behavior and demeanor of the
witness. There are subtle nuances in a witness' demeanor that give the jury clues as to the
veracity of testimony. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 245, at 727. Care must be used in
evaluating potential hearsay testimony, as the Federal Rules and the confrontation clause
are not co-extensive. While "the [s]ixth [a]mendment's [c]onfrontation [c]lause and the
evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots [the] Court has never equated the
two." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970). Where does this leave our analysis? The
Supreme Court has broadly held that a hearsay statement must possess sufficient "indicia
of reliability" to be allowed before the jury. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89 (1970). If the state-
ment, however, is within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, it is assumed to possess
sufficient reliability. Green, 399 U.S. at 161. The exception presented here, arguably of
the "firmly rooted" variety, should withstand constitutional inspection. In non-criminal
cases a less rigorous standard is applied. State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 479, 698 P.2d 724
(1985). The sixth amendment is subject to exceptions which do not interfere with its
spirit, and "[s]uch exceptions were obviously intended to be respected." Mattox, 156 U.S.
at 243.
30. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243; see MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 252, at 749-52.
31. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155, 161 (1970); Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, 196 (1953) (confrontation clause is not mere codification of hearsay rule).
32. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence: " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
FED. R. EvID. 401.
33. This intention is clear from Rules 402 and 403. Rule 402 provides: "All relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided .... " FED. R. EVID. 402. Rule 403
provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury .... FED. R. EVID. 403.
34. Rule 602-Lack of Personal Knowledge, states the following: "A witness may not
testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has
personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need
not, consist of the witness' own testimony .... " FED. R. EVID. 602. It is clear that it is
the hearsay declarant who must have personal knowledge of the event. The in-court wit-
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B. The Doctrine of Res Gestae and the Common Law History of
Rules 803(1), (2) and (3)
The common law doctrine of res gestae 3 6 has fallen into disrepute
primarily because of its use as a substitute for exact analysis by courts
and practitioners. 37 Res gestae has been used to describe statements
so spontaneous as to be considered part of a transaction rather than
merely a witness' account of it.31 Often the phrase was used to admit
evidence in a common-sense, if somewhat inexact fashion.39 One
commentator has noted that the phrase res gestae has "done nothing
but bewilder and perplex."' Scholars have attempted to dissipate the
confusion and ease analysis by categorizing the separate classes of
possible res gestae exceptions to the hearsay rule.4'
Today, the res gestae doctrine is divided into at least four discrete
areas:42 (1) declarations of present sense impressions;4 3 (2) excited
utterances;44 (3) declarations of present bodily conditions;45 and (4)
ness normally only has personal knowledge of the declarant's statements. J. WEINSTEIN,
WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, 602[01] (1987) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN] (citing United States
v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1985) (hearsay rule requires declarant have
personal knowledge of events recounted)). Personal knowledge may "appear from [the]
statement or be inferable from circumstances." FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's
note.
35. See FED. R. EVID. 403, supra note 33. For a recent application Rule 403 "balanc-
ing" analysis, see United States v. Driggs, 823 F.2d 52, 54 n.2 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing
United States v. Schwartz, 790 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1986)).
36. In order to form part of the res gestae a statement must form "a part of the
transaction, occurrence, or event that it describes." B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 10:1, at 251
(Gard 6th ed. 1972). The common characteristic of such statements is their spontaneity.
MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 290 at 838; see supra note 1 and accompanying text for a
more detailed definition.
37. Morgan, supra note 2, at 229. As Morgan puts it:
The marvelous capacity of a Latin phrase to serve as a substitute for reasoning,
and the confusion of thought inevitably accompanying the use of inaccurate
terminology, are nowhere better illustrated than in decisions dealing with the
admissibility of evidence as "res gestae." It is probable that this troublesome
expression owes its existence and persistence in our law of evidence to an incli-
nation of judges and lawyers to avoid the toilsome exertion of exact analysis and
precise thinking.
Id.
38. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Mosely, 75 U.S. 397, 401 (1869) (statements of insured,
as to bodily condition, admitted to prove he had fallen down stairs).
39. See, e.g., FiSCH, supra note 2, § 1003, at 583-84.
40. Morgan, supra note 2, at 229.
41. Id. at 231-39.
42. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 288, at 835. Morgan, however, would argue for
seven subdivisions. See Morgan, supra note 2.
43. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 298, at 860; see supra note 4 for a description of the
present sense impression exception.and Rule 803(1).
44. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 297, at 854; see supra note 5 for a description of the
excited utterances exception and Rule 803(2).
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declarations of present mental states.46 Today's present sense impres-
sion exception is found in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) 7 and its
many state analogues. This rule has a firm historical foundation and,
although it was somewhat unfamiliar when the Federal Rules were
introduced, it was not a mere invention of the drafters. 8 The hearsay
exception for excited utterances49 is codified at Rule 803(2)."0 The
last two remnants of res gestae, hearsay exceptions for declarations of
present bodily conditions and mental states, are found in Rule
803(3). 5'
Courts still occasionally speak in terms of res gestae rather than one
of the more specific subsets of the doctrine.52 The historical confusion
surrounding the res gestae exceptions has led some to call for a more
45. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 291, at 838; see supra note 6 for a description of the
present bodily conditions exception and Rule 803(3). This aspect of Rule 803(3) is, not
later referenced. The present mental states exception of Rule 803(3) is sufficient for the
purposes of this Note.
46. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 295, at 846; see supra note 6 for a description of the
present mental states exception of Rule 803(3).
47. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
48. See s'upra note 4. Morgan's sixth type of exception has essentially the same
characteristics:
(6) Cases in which the utterance is contemporaneous with a non-verbal act, inde-
pendently admissible, relating to that act and throwing some light upon it. Here
the utterance is offered to prove its truth and is obnoxious to the hearsay rule.
Is there any justification for admitting it?... First, it is in essence a declaration
of a presently existing state of mind, for it is nothing more than an assertion of
his presently existing sense impressions. As such it has the quality of spontane-
ity .... Second, since the statement is contemporaneous with the event, it is
made at the place of the event. Consequently, the event is open to perception by
the senses of the person to whom the declaration is made, and by whom it is
usually reported on the witness stand.
Morgan, supra note 2, at 236 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).
49. Morgan classified such statements as the following:
(7) Cases in which the utterance is made concerning a startling event by a declar-
ant laboring under such a stress of nervous excitement, caused by that event, as to
make such utterance spontaneous and unreflective ..... Its sole guaranty of
trustworthiness lies in its spontaneity .... [P]rior to 1880... contemporaneous-
ness rather than spontaneity was emphasized, although the latter was clearly
recognized as highly important .... [I]t is only since the publication of Dean
Wigmore's work that this exception to the hearsay rule has gained wide
recognition.
Id. at 238 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).
50. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
52. Cooper v. State, 765 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Okla. Cr. 1988); People v. Ayala, 142
A.D.2d 147, 534 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1016 (2d Dep't 1988); People v. Sauer, 177 Ill. App. 3d
870, 127 Ill. Dec. 117, 532 N.E.2d 946 (2d Dep't 1988); MCCORMICK, supra note 7,
§ 288, at 835.
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narrow interpretation of the current exceptions.53 There is little rea-
son, however, to permit the past misuse of the inexact doctrine of res
gestae to influence how the present sense impression exception is
applied."
III. Rule 803: Current Case Analysis-Internal Inconsistencies
The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule has been
the subject of debate and controversy. 5 Certain of these polemics are
founded in the apparent novelty of the exception, while others ema-
nate from inconsistencies among the present sense impression, the ex-
cited utterance, and the state of mind exceptions.56 A coherent
method for evaluating these three hearsay exceptions can be devel-
oped by analyzing the derivation of the exceptions.5 7
A. Rule 803(1) and the Question of Corroboration
The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule is not
new or novel.58 Its roots date back to the early common law,5 9
although some courts relied on the exception without explicit refer-
ence to it.6" Today, at least twenty-nine states recognize the present
53. See, e.g., Waltz I, supra note 24, at 22 (calling for additional requirements for
admission of evidence under. "sleeper exception" of Rule 803(1)).
54. See infra notes 151-55.
55. See infra iotes 58, 88 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 114-48 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 160-85 for a suggested approach.
58. The exception was approved by McCormick, although Wigmore might disagree:
Although [present sense impression] statements lack whatever assurance of reli-
ability there is in the effect of an exciting event, other factors offer safeguards.
First, since the report concerns observations being made at the time of the state-
ment it is safe from any error caused by a defect of the declarant's memory.
Second, a requirement that the statement be made contemporaneously with the
observation means that there will be little or no time for calculated misstate-
ment. Third, the statement will usually have been made to a third person...
who, being present at the time and scene of the observation, will probably have
an opportunity to observe the situation himself and thus provide a check on the
accuracy of the declarant's statement, i.e., furnish corroboration. Moreover,
since the declarant himself will often be available for cross-examination, his
credibility will be subject to substantial verification before the trier of fact.
MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 298, at 860 (footnotes omitted).
59. One of the earliest references to the present sense impression exception was made
by James Bradley Thayer. Thayer, supra note 25. It apparently fell into disuse, probably
because of a misunderstanding of its theoretical underpinnings. Thayer pointed, with
some disdain, to cases spanning 1693 to 1869 to support the existence of this exception.
See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 397 (1868).
60. Emens v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 223 F. 810 (N.D.N.Y. 1915), cert. denied, 242
U.S. 627 (1916) (question was whether train had signaled before collision between car
and train). Witness' statement, "Why don't the train whistle?," Id. at 825, was disinter-
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sense impression exception to the hearsay rule in their codified rules
of evidence, most of which have been patterned after the Federal
Rules of Evidence.6 The elements required for a statement to be ad-
mitted as a present sense impression under the Federal Rules are: (1)
the declarant must have personally witnessed the event described; 62
(2) the declaration must be an explanation or description of the
event; 63 and (3) the declaration must be contemporaneous with the
event.' The rationale for the present sense impression exception is
that substantial contemporaneousness "negative[s] the likelihood of
deliberate or conscious" misstatement. 65 A perfect example of a pres-
ent sense impression is a radio announcer's play-by-play description
of a baseball game.66 In essence, the declarant is merely a conduit for
ested, spontaneous, and relevant, and therefore became part of the res gestae. Id. at 824-
26.
61. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EvID. 803(1); ARIZ. R. EVID. 803(1); ARK. R. EVID.
803(1); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1241; COLO. R. EviD. 803(1); FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.803(1);
HAWAII R. EVID. 803(b)(1); IDAHO R. EVID. 803(1); IOWA R. EVID. 803(1); KAN.
CODE CIV. P. § 60-460(d)(1); ME. R. EVID. 803(1); MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(D);
MONT. R. EVID. 803(1); NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 4, § 51.085; N.H.R. EvID. 803(1); N.J.R.
EVID. 63(4)(a); N.M.R. EVID. 803(1); N.C.R. EvID. 803(1); N.D.R. EvID. 803(1); OHIO
R. EvID. 803(1); OKLA. EVID. CODE § 2803(1); S.D.R. EVID. § 19-16-5; TEX. R. EVID.
803(1); UTAH R. EVID. 803(1); VT. R. EvID. 803(1); WASH. R. EVID. 803(a)(1); W. VA.
R. EVID. 803(1); Wis. R. EVID. 908.03(1); Wyo. R. EvID. 803(1). Colorado's rule re-
quires precise contemporaneity and deletes the words "or immediately thereafter" found
in the Federal Rule. Florida and Ohio add language that a present sense impression is
admissible unless the statement is made under circumstances that indicate its lack of
trustworthiness. FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.803(1); OHIO R. EVID. 803(1). Minnesota de-
fines its present sense impression as non-hearsay. MINN. R. EViD. 801(d)(1)(D). An ex-
press provision that the substance of the statement be corroborated is not found among
these statutes.
62. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus. Corp., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1228
n.48 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (no mention of corroboration requirement).
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also In re Japanese Electronic Prod., 723 F.2d 238, 303 (3d Cir. 1983).
65. FED. R. EVID. 803, advisory committee's note. See United States v. Narisco, 446
F. Supp. 252, 288 (D.C. 1977). Courts focus on the "substantial contemporaneity" of the
event and statement as a guarantor of veracity. See, e.g., United States v. Peacock, 654
F.2d 339, 350 (5th Cir. 1981), quoted in United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d 1491, 1501
(I1th Cir. 1985).
66. The baseball analogy helps explain several important aspects of the present sense
impression:
If you turn on your radio during a baseball game, you will be inundated by
present sense impressions. The utterances of the sportscaster describing and
explaining what he observes on the playing field as it is taking place are quintes-
sential present sense impressions. But the sportscaster's between-innings or
post-game analysis would not qualify for this hearsay exception, for want of
contemporaneity.
If a present sense impression is made under stress, of excitement from the
event or condition that it describes or explains, then it overlaps with the excep-
tion for an excited utterance. . . . This is often the case. For example, if a
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his immediately preceding sense impressions.
One point of controversy is whether statements of present sense im-
pression also require corroboration6" by an "equally percipient wit-
ness, '"68 or some other corroboration of the substance of the
declaration before allowing its admission into evidence.69 Congress
chose not to include an express corroboration provision under Rule
803(1), although the advisory committee comments do mention the
possibility of an equally percipient witness.7" Several courts, however,
have determined that some corroboration is necessary," although
sportscaster is excited by the sporting event that he is watching, his play-by-
play description qualifies both as a present sense impression and an excited ut-
terance. If he is bored by it, his description qualifies only as a present sense
impression.
D. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK 89-90 (2d ed. 1983).
67. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 298, at 863 n.24. It has been noted that corrobora-
tion is an added assurance of accuracy; this does not, however, make it a requirement.
"The legal mind is on occasion seemingly unable to resist the temptation to drive in one
more nail, albeit it be a crooked one." Id. The theoretical foundation of 803(1) renders it
reliable enough that corroboration not be required. "[I]ts underlying rationale offers suffi-
cient assurances of reliability without the superaddition of a further requirement of cor-
roboration." Id. at 862. Cf. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 340-41 (1962)
(explaining how requirements of admission as present sense impression provide reliabil-
ity, and how witness may be cross-examined as to circumstances surrounding declarant's
statement, which enables trier of fact to put "fair value" (i.e., weight) upon declarant's
statement).
68. An "equally percipient witness" is one who was present at the time and place that
the statement was uttered. In other words, such a witness is one "who would have equal
opportunities to observe and hence check a misstatement." Houston Oxygen v. Davis,
139 Tex. 1, 6, 161 S.W.2d 474, 477 (1942); see Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Ex-
ception to the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869, 883
(1981) [hereinafter Waltz II].
69. See Waltz II, supra note 68, at 885.
70. Congress included express corroboration provisions in Rules 803(24) and
804(b)(3). FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(3). For instance Rule 804(b)(3), statements
against interest, explicitly states that a hearsay statement "is not admissible unless cor-
roborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(3). Furthermore, adding this sort of requirement to the present sense im-
pression exception would be a "radical departure" from the general pattern of exceptions
to the hearsay rule. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 329-30, 508 A.2d 976, 983-84 (1986).
71. See Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 343 Pa. Super. 201, 217-18, 494 A.2d 426, 434-
35 (1985) (victim's statements over phone to police dispatcher, describing his abduction,
robbery and abandonment were not within present sense impression exception as they
were not made in presence of another person); Jones v. State, 65 Md. App. 121, 123-25,
499 A.2d 511, 512-13 (1985), rev'd, 311 Md. 23, 532 A.2d 169 (1987) (testimony of fellow
officer of defendant as to his overhearing truckdriver's radio conversation not admitted);
Hewitt v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 123 Mich. App. 309, 316-17, 333 N.W.2d 264,
267 (1983) (wrongful death action; officer's record of statement of witness that decedent
had jumped in front of train, held not admissible as present sense impression, as officer,
who was not present at time of accident, could not corroborate truth of witness' state-
ments); State v. Case, 100 N.M. 714, 717-18, 676 P.2d 241, 244-45 (1984) (statement,
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others have dispensed with the requirement entirely.7 2 A recent New
York case, People v. Luke,73 achieved notoriety74 by raising a new
issue with respect to hearsay in New York. In Luke, the court an-
swered the question of whether a telephone conversation can supply
reliability sufficient to admit the declarant's telephonic statement. 75
The court answered in the affirmative. 76 This type of "boot-strap"
argument has been accepted in excited utterances cases.77 In Luke, a
burglary case, the state sought to introduce as evidence two tape re-
cordings between a citizen and a 911 emergency operator.78 Applying
the present sense impression exception, the court allowed admission
of the evidence, 79 but found both the excited utterance ° and the busi-
"There goes Nancy Mitchell," made several days after her supposed murder, excluded
because declarant had not seen her, and statement was of questionable nature).
72. See Duke v. American Olean Tile Co., 155 Mich. App. 555, 570-71, 400 N.W.2d
677, 684 (1986) (decedent's statements during telephone conversation approximately
three minutes after slip and fall, "The floor was wet, my feet went out from under me,
and I fell," admitted as present sense impression; whether conversation took place as
plaintiff remembered, or as other witnesses did was question of fact for jury); State v.
Flesher, 286 N.W.2d 215, 216-18 (Iowa 1979) (testimony of victim's husband concerning
telephone conversation with victim shortly before murder was admissible as a present
sense impression); People v. Slaton, 135 Mich. App. 328, 334-35, 354 N.W.2d 326, 330
(1984) (murder victim's taped emergency phone call containing pleas for help and mercy
admissible as both present sense impression and excited utterance); State v. Rendon, 148
Ariz. 524, 528, 715 P.2d 777, 781 (Ct. App. 1986) (police recording of neighbor's descrip-
tion of burglary in progress admissible as present sense impression; stressed contempora-
neity); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 117-19, 326 A.2d 387, 390 (1974)
(testimony of murder victim's mother regarding phone call with her daughter ten minutes
prior to her being found dead held admissible). Cf. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 330-31,
508 A.2d 976, 984-85 (1986) (content of murder victim's statement, identifying woman in
apartment, to witness over phone, offered sufficient evidence that victim was describing
events as he perceived them, thus they were admissible as present sense impression).
73. 136 Misc. 2d 733, 519 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
74. People v. Luke, 136 Misc. 2d 733, 519 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sup. Ct. 1987). The case
was commented upon in the New York Law Journal. 198 N.Y.L.J. 46, Sept. 3, 1987, at 1,
col. 2 (case incorrectly referred to as People v. Duke). It was also noted in the ABA
Journal. Trends in the Law.: Ring My Bell, ABA J., Dec 1, 1987, at 108, col. I (same
incorrect reference).
75. Luke, 136 Misc. 2d at 739, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 320 (dictum). The issue presented in
the Luke case was "whether a telephone conversation can ever supply an indicia of relia-
bility sufficient to support an inference that what was reported by the declarant reflects
the sense of what confronted him." Id.
76. Luke, 136 Misc. 2d at 739, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
77. United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1986) (excited statement itself
can qualify as excited utterance under Rule 803(2)). See infra notes 131-33 and accompa-
nying text.
78. Luke, 136 Misc. 2d at 739, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
79. Id. at 136 Misc. 2d 734-35, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 317-20.
80. See supra note 5 and accompanying text, for a description of the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule.
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ness records"' exceptions inapplicable.8 2
The courts of New York had considered the corroboration issue
only once prior to Luke. 3 In People v. Watson, 4 the prosecution
sought to introduce statements made in a telephone conversation with
the deceased the evening before her body was discovered.85 The trial
court admitted the non-excited statement of the victim indicating that
the superintendent was at the door to place the accused at the scene of
the crime. s6 The appellate division reversed on the grounds that the
present sense impression was inapplicable because the witness was not
present to observe the event described by the declarant s7 Although
the court did not decide the issue, it is arguable that if the declaration
had been excited, and thus admissible as an excited utterance, the case
would not have been reversed. The result reached in Watson is an
excellent example of how a requirement of corroboration can be used
to weaken the present sense impression exception, while such a re-
81. See FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
82. Luke, 136 Misc. 2d at 734, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
83. People v. Watson, 109 Misc. 2d 71, 437 N.Y.S.2d 1016, rev'd 100 A.D.2d 452,
474 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1984) (in homicide prosecution, trial court admitted testi-
mony regarding telephone conversation that witness had with murder victim). The ap-
pellate division reversed, stating that the testimony did not come within the present sense
impression because the witness was not present to observe the event described by the vic-
tim and there were no other indicia of the statement's reliability. People v. Watson, 100
A.D.2d 452, 463-66, 474 N.Y.S.2d 978, 986-87. Further, admission into evidence of such
statement was an error of constitutional dimension, in violation of defendant's right of
confrontation. Id.
84. Watson, 109 Misc. 2d 71, 437 N.Y.S.2d 1016, rev'd, 100 A.D.2d 452, 474 N.Y.2d
978.
85. Watson, 109 Misc. 2d at 71-72, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 1017. During a phone conversa-
tion indicating that the victim was preparing some codfish and potatoes, her doorbell
rang. She returned and said, "[T]he super is at the door. I am going to let him in, so call
me back if you have time." The victim's bathtub had a leak and the super was to come
and check it. The victim's body was found the next day, and there was an uneaten plate
of codfish and potatoes. Watson denied that he had even been in the victim's apartment
that day. The trial court admitted the conversation for its truth to place Watson at the
scene of the crime. Id. at 72-73, 78-79, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 1017, 1020-21.
86. Watson, at 72-73, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 1017-21.
87. Watson, 100 A.D.2d at 464-66, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 986-87. The court noted that
unless a hearsay exception is "firmly rooted," additional indicia of reliability are required
before admission of evidence and the present sense impression exception is not "firmly
rooted." Id.; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). The excited utterance, however, is
in this category. State v. Yslas, 139 Ariz. 60, 65, 676 P.2d 1118, 1123 (1984); State v.
Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 785-86 (Minn. 1986); State v. Bawdon, 386 N.W.2d 484, 487
(S.D. 1986); Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Given the
common origin of these two exceptions, and their comparable though distinct elements, it
is odd that one class and not the other be considered "firmly rooted." Perhaps it was
Wigmore's concentration on excitement as a guarantor of reliability. See infra notes 123-
25 and accompanying text.
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quirement is not applied to its companion rules."s
Two of the early modern cases relying on the present sense impres-
sion exception are Houston Oxygen v. Davis, 9 and Tampa Electric Co.
v. Getrost.90 In their application of the present sense impression ex-
ception, both cases stress the concurrent nature of the statement and
the event, and the lack of time for a calculated misstatement. 91 The
analysis in these two cases retains the notion, present in the concept of
res gestae, that the statement is so closely connected with the event it
describes that it should be considered part of the event.92 These fac-
tors, of themselves, give the present sense impression its reliability. 93
At the federal level, several recent cases have outlined the require-
ments for admission of evidence under Rule 803(1). The district court
in United States v. Obayagbona94 expressly rejected the requirement
that the substance of the declarant's statement be corroborated. 95
Confusion, however, still arises from the standard espoused by the
Houston Oxygen court, that "the statement will usually be made to
another.., who would have equal opportunities to observe and hence
to check a misstatement." 96 It remains unclear whether this phrase
means that the veracity of a present sense impression must be sup-
ported by corroboration before it can be admitted into evidence, or
merely that the existence of such support is an additional guarantee of
88. That New York has decided to weaken the present sense impression exception is
shown by the shifting of this exception from 803(1), in the 1980 version of the New York
Proposed Code of Evidence, to 804(b)(1) in the 1982 version of the code. Compare N.Y.
CODE EVID. Rule 803(1) (Proposed Draft 1980) with N.Y. CODE EVID. Rule 804(b)(1)
(Proposed Draft 1982).
89. 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942). Houston Oxygen was an automobile accident
case, where defendant's car passed witness's car four miles before the accident. The issue
was whether to admit testimony relating to a statement made by the witness that "they
must have been drunk, that we would find them somewhere on the road wrecked if they
kept that rate of speed up." Id. at 5, 161 S.W.2d at 476. The court determined, as a
matter of law, that the evidence was admissible, and that the trial court had erred in
excluding the testimony. Id. at 8, 161 S.W.2d at 477. The court determined that "[tihere
was no time for a calculated statement." Id. at 6, 161 S.W.2d at 476.
90. 151 Fla. 558, 10 So. 2d 83 (1942) (unexcited statement of deceased power lineman
that he had called to have power turned off).
91. Houston Oxygen v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 6, 161 S.W.2d 474, 476 (1942); Tampa
Electric Co. v. Getrost, 151 Fla. 558, 563-64, 10 So. 2d 83, 84-85 (1942).
92. See supra notes 1, 36.
93. FED. R. EvID. 803(1) advisory committee's note.
94. 627 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (tape of drug enforcement agent's exultant
post-arrest statement held admissible under both 803(2) and 803(1)).
95. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. at 339 (citing United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779,
785 (7th Cir. 1979)). The court stated that "[u]nder the Federal Rules a present sense
impression need not be corroborated, but where corroborating circumstances or witnesses
are available, the hearsay gains in trustworthiness and probative force." Id.
96. Houston Oxygen, 139 Tex. at 6, 161 S.W.2d at 477 (emphasis added).
19891
104 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVII
trustworthiness.97 Courts have muddled the issue further by miscon-
struing the work of commentators,9" and by applying obsolete analy-
ses of the requirements of Rule 803(l). 9'
Similarly, a recent Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Blakey,"°°
gives rise to needless confusion. The court applied an analysis that
focuses on whether an equally percipient'0 ' witness must corroborate
the out-of-court statement, 10 2 rather than on whether the declarant
and his statement satisfy the three basic requirements for a statement
to be admitted as a present sense impression.0 3 The court entangled
the analysis further by suggesting that the need for a corroborating
witness is "somewhat reduced" when the declarant's statement is tape
recorded, thus leaving little room for uncertainty as to its content.10 4
The Federal Rules provide mechanisms, however, that deal more
precisely with the type of evidence used in Blakey. 05 These devices
include the requirements that: (1) the evidence be relevant; 106 (2) the
probative value of the evidence outweigh any prejudice the opponent
might suffer; l'0 and (3) the declarant be speaking from "personal
knowledge."' 1 8 This type of approach does not abandon the "categor-
97. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. at 339.
98. See, e.g., People v. Luke, 136 Misc. 2d 733, 519 N.Y.S.2d 316, 319 (Sup. Ct.
1987). The court cited Waltz II, supra note 68, as support for the proposition that there
need only be corroborative evidence that the statement was in fact made. Luke, 136
Misc. 2d at 737, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 319. Waltz, however, was disagreeing with the "brief
and murky" reasoning of the Houston Oxygen court. Waltz II, supra note 68, at 885. In
the subsequent pages it becomes painfully apparent that Waltz intended exactly the oppo-
site reading of his article. Waltz "strongly suggests more than simple corroboration that
such a statement was made" is required before admissibility. Id. Furthermore, he urges
that what is meant by corroboration is "an assessment of [the statement's] factual accu-
racy as an observation." Id. (emphasis added).
99. Waltz II, supra note 68, at 885.
100. 607 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979) (surveillance team witnessed events up to and imme-
diately after statements were made but not at the time of the statements).
101. For a definition of "equally percipient" see supra note 68.
102. United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785-86 (7th Cir. 1979) (tape recorded
conversation between victim and witness less than 23 minutes after defendants had ex-
torted money from victim was admissible as present sense impression). There were wit-
nesses to the events leading up to, and subsequent to the meeting. There were not,
however, witnesses to the actual statement. Id.
103. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
104. Blakey, 607 F.2d at 785.
105. The analysis of surrounding circumstances in Blakey is actually a disguised per-
sonal knowledge test. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
106. See supra note 32 and accompanying text for a description of the relevance re-
quirement under the Federal Rules.
107. See supra note 33 and accompanying text for a description of the probative value
requirement under the Federal Rules.
108. See supra note 34 and accompanying text for the text of Rule 602, which describes
the personal knowledge requirement under the Federal Rules. It is clear that some courts
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ical approach" 09 to hearsay exceptions which the Federal Rules have
created. Rather, it retains the categories of Rules 803(1), (2) and (3),
and preserves the policies expressed by the Rules."' The apparent
split among states, with respect to the corroboration issue, demon-
strates the difficulty courts have in dealing with fact situations which
previously would have been dealt with using imprecise res gestae
analysis. ''
As the cases above indicate, the issue of whether the present sense
impression exception contains an extra corroboration requirement has
fostered judicial confusion. Moreover, upon analysis, it is clear that
courts and commentators have further confused the matter by apply-
ing dissimilar tests." 2 Indeed, there is not even agreement as to what
has to be corroborated. "3
use "corroboration," or "equal percipience" as a substitute for a separate requirement
that the declarant be speaking from personal knowledge. See, e.g., Booth v. State, 306
Md. 313, 325, 508 A.2d 976, 981 (1986).
[I]t is clear that the declarant must speak from personal knowledge, i.e., the
declarant's own sensory perceptions....
[I]n some instances the content of the statement may itself be sufficient to
demonstrate that it is more likely than not the product of personal perception,
and in other instances extrinsic evidence may be required to satisfy this thresh-
old requirement of admissibility.
Id. In addition, the trial judge may use inadmissible testimony to determine if the declar-
ant spoke from personal knowledge. Id. at 981 n.6. Some propose that "personal knowl-
edge" be made an additional, explicit requirement for the admission of evidence under
the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Note, The Present
Sense Impression Hearsay Exception: An Analysis of the Contemporaneity and Corrobora-
tion Requirements, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 666, 677 (1976) (arguing that present sense im-
pression bear its own requirement of personal knowledge). This analysis is redundant in
light of Rule 602. See supra note 34.
109. The strategy of the Federal Rules of Evidence is "categorical"; that is, the issue of
admissibility is determined by the use of hearsay categories. If a statement comes within
one of the accepted exceptions, "the declaration is admissible without preliminary finding
of probable credibility by the judge ...." United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 272
(2d Cir. 1984). This type of approach is not without costs. "[It] excludes certain hearsay
statements with a high degree of trustworthiness and admits certain statements with a
low one. This evil was doubtless thought preferable to requiring preliminary determina-
tions of the judge with respect to trustworthiness, with the attendant possibilities of delay,
prejudgment and encroachment on the province of the jury." Id.; see also WEINSTEIN,
supra note 34, 800[02], at 800-13.
110. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (states purpose of and guidelines for construction of Fed-
eral Rules).
111. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text for a description of how various
states wrestle with this problem.
112. Waltz would have us examine the "factual accuracy" of the hearsay statements.
Waltz II, supra note 68, at 885. Others, however, simply admit the statement if it com-
plies with the express requirements for admission of Rule 803(1). See, e.g., Booth v. State,
306 Md. 313, 330-31, 508 A.2d 976, 985 (1986).
113. See Waltz II, supra note 68, at 885-86; Booth, 306 Md. at 329-30, 508 A.2d at
983-84.
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B. Inconsistencies Within Rule 803
The present sense impression exception has been described as an
ideal version of the excited utterance exception."I4 The same contem-
poraneity is present, but the declarant's faculties are not clouded by
excitement.' Initially, a present sense impression should be re-
garded as more reliable than an excited utterance.1' 6 To require an
extra element of corroboration of the substance of the declarant's
statement is imprudent, as it confuses the process of admission of evi-
dence with the question of weight, which is properly for the.jury.' '7
Present sense impression case analysis is all the more perplexing in
'light of the intention of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence
that there be much overlap between Rules 803(1) and 803(2) in order
to avoid "needless niggling.""'
1. Excited Utterance-Rule 803(2)
Excited utterances fall within an accepted hearsay exception.' 9
114. One commentator notes that statements viewed with suspicion because they are
not made under the influence of a startling event, or emotional stress, should actually be
regarded as more reliable for precisely that reason. The most reliable type of statement is
"made in immediate response to an external stimulus which produces no shock or ner-
vous excitement whatever." Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evi-
dence-Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 439 (1928) (emphasis
supplied) [hereinafter Hutchins & Slesinger]. This type of statement, if relevant, should
be admitted to the jury. It is more reliable than the excited utterance exception, which is
used without question. Id. at 439-40.
115. Id. at 439. As commentators Hutchins and Slesinger put it: "What the emotion
gains by way of overcoming the desire to lie, it loses by impairing the declarant's power of
observation." Id.
116. Id.; see United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 1979) ("the underly-
ing rationale of the present sense impression exception is that the substantial contempora-
neity of event and statement minimizes unreliability due to defective recollection or
conscious fabrication"); Nuttal v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 1956) ( pre-
Rules case found that statements "made substantially at the time the event they described
was perceived, are free from the possibility of lapse of memory on the part of the declar-
ant. And [sic] this contemporaneousness lessens the likelihood of conscious misrepresen-
tation"); Slough, Res Gestae, 2 Kan. L. Rev. 246, 266-67 (1954).
117. Chadbourne, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-a Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c)
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 947 (1962). "In terms of the
time-honored formula, credibility is a matter of fact for the jury, not a matter of law for
the judge." Id.
118. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note. Note, however, that the codified
differences remain. The time period for a present sense impression is more limited, as is
the subject matter, while there is no requirement that the declarant's reflective capacities
be stilled by excitement. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2809 n.6 (1988) (excited utterances admis-
sible in the face of the confrontation clause) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171 (1987) (hearsay statements of co-conspirator under Rule 801 (d)(2)(E) may be used by
court to determine if conspiracy exists)); United States v. Vazquez, 857 F.2d 857, 864 (1st
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The excited utterance exception is more easily accepted than the pres-
ent sense impression exception largely because of historical acci-
dent. 120  Indeed, the relative paucity of situations giving rise to
present sense impressions leaves the average person unfamiliar with
its truth-inducing qualities.' 2 ' The notion that a calm description of
an event be admitted over the hearsay rule is counter-intuitive, and as
a practical matter, unexciting events do not often become the subject
of litigation.' 22
Wigmore chose to concentrate on excitement as a guarantor, and
the emphasis in the law of spontaneous statements shifted from what
Thayer" 3 "had observed to a requirement of an exciting event and a
resulting stilling of the declarant's reflective faculties."' 24 These two
factors, that present sense impressions are' rare, or subsumed into ex-
cited utterances, and that the present sense impression was disre-
garded by a preeminent evidence scholar, have resulted in disparate
treatment of the present sense impression and the excited utterance
Cir. 1988) (hearsay statement of co-conspirator admitted as excited utterance even
though clearly not admissible under 801(d)(2)(E) because conspiracy had ended); Mor-
gan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 946 n.7 (4th Cir. 1988) (excited utterance of witness admit-
ted even though wholly incompetent to testify at trial). But see Miller v. Keating, 754
F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1985) (utterance of unidentified declarant not admissible under Rule
803(2)). The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is codified at Federal Rules
of Evidence 803(2). See supra note 5, for the text of 803(2).
120. Excited utterances overlie present sense impressions, and could therefore be used
to admit evidence in a particular case, as people are more likely to comment on exciting
than non-exciting occurrences. Thus, there are almost no cases applying the present
sense impression exception prior to the enactment of Rule 803(1). WEINSTEIN, supra note
34, 803(1)[01]. Indeed, some statements that are candidates for the present sense im-
pression are not treated as such because they are "within the purview of the excited
utterance exception...'." Id. 803(l)[01] n. 13 (quoting Wabisky v. D.C. Transit Sys.,
Inc., 309 F.2d 317, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger,J.)).
121. WEINSTEIN, supra note 34, 803(l)[01]. While some maintain that the present
sense impression is "awesomely elastic," See, e.g., Waltz I, supra note 24, at 24, others
realize that the exception is in fact "more circumscribed than an excited utterance be-
cause it must describe or explain the event or condition that is the subject of the hearsay
assertion. An excited utterance need only relate thereto." D. BINDER, HEARSAY HAND-
BOOK 90 (2d ed. 1983) (emphasis supplied).
122. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 298, at 861.
123. An early analysis of present sense impressions was that of James Bradley Thayer.
Thayer was satisfied that "[w]hile this sort of exception to the hearsay rule has always
existed, it has never been well worked out." Thayer, supra note 25, at 82. He opined that
there existed an exception for "statements, oral or written, made by those present when a
thing took place, made about it and importing what is present at the very time-present,
either in itself or in some fresh indications of it, to the faculties of the witness as well as of
the declarant." Id. at 83. Wigmore, however, argued that contemporaneousness of the
event and the declarant's description were not sufficient to guarantee trustworthiness, and
would rather rely on the "stress of nervous excitement ...which stills the reflective
faculties." 6 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1747, at 195.
124. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 298, at 860.
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exceptions to the hearsay rule. Wigmore's analysis of the excited ut-
terance exception to the hearsay rule may have led to an unfortunate
restriction in the development of the present sense impression
exception. 12
5
At least two basic requirements must be met for admission of an
excited utterance. First, there must be a sufficiently startling event to
render the reflective capacity of the declarant inoperative.126 Second,
the statement or utterance of the declarant must have been in sponta-
neous reaction to the event. 27 Under the Federal Rules there is a
third requirement that the statement relate to the circumstances of
the startling event. 1
28
It is paradoxical that excited utterances are admitted without con-
cern for corroboration.' 29 Athough such utterances are no more re-
liabile than present sense impressions, 30 it is generally held that the
excited utterance itself is sufficient proof that the exciting event oc-
curred.131 No corroborative proof that the event even occurred 'is re-
125. Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WASH. L. REV. 91, 98 (1937).
126. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 297, at 854-55; see also 6 WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§ 1747, at 195.
127. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 297, at 855; see also 6 WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§ 1747, at 195.
128. See, e.g., People v. Gee, 406 Mich. 279, 282, 278 N.W.2d 304, 305 (1979).
129. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 114, at 440. The authors point out that excited
utterances should be more closely scrutinized than present sense impressions which do
not interfere with perception. They noted that even though most courts "do admit the
statements of excited bystanders, [however,] where there is a stimulus which is not suffi-
cient to produce excitement, they do not ordinarily attribute to it the truth-evoking quali-
ties ascribed to shock." Id. at 434. If just before a pedestrian is run down by a car, a
witness calmly watching from a bus comments on its high speed, the statement would be
inadmissible. Id. at 435.
130. Id. The shock which supposedly deprives the observer of the ability to fabricate
also affects the accuracy of his perceptions. This notion is reflected in the charge to the
jury in Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 139 U.S. 551 (1891), quoted in Hinton, States of Mind and
the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 419 n.67 (1933). The pertinent part of the jury
charge was as follows:
It may, at first, seem surprising that a man who himself wears the shoe should
not be able to tell where it pinches; that a man who has his foot crushed should
not necessarily know better than any other party where it was hurt, and how it
was hurt; and yet it is not an uncommon thing for other men who saw the thing
done, to be able to tell better than the man himself how the accident happened.
The shock and pain may have the effect of rendering the man quite incapable of
telling just exactly how the thing took place.
The judge's view agrees with that of the experts. Id.
131. United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1986). In Moore, the court found
that the three requirements for admission of a statement as an excited utterance under
Rule 803(2) were all satisfied by the statement itself. Id. at 571-72. Thus, an excited
utterance can "bootstrap" itself into admissibility. Similarly, in State v. Smith, 358
S.E.2d 188, 194-95 (W. Va. 1987), the declarant's statement that "Junior and Slim [were]
drinking and fighting," given the "agitated and disturbed" tone was sufficient in itself to
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quired for admission of these statements. 32  When instances of
mistaken excited utterances are uncovered, however, the initial prefer-
ence for them as a vehicle for the admission of hearsay tends to
evaporate. 33
2. State of Mind-Rule 803(3)
The requirements for admission 134 of a statement under the present
mental state exception 135 of Rule 803(3)136 are: (1) it must relate to a
condition of mind or emotion existing at the time of the statement;
and (2) it must have been made under circumstances indicating ap-
parent sincerity.' 37 Even where these factors are satisfied, however,
the explicit qualifications to the rule may still bar admission. 38 Fur-
qualify as an excited utterance. Id. at 194. The statement need not have been related by
one who was present at the exciting event, and the utterance itself may contain sufficient
indicia that the exciting event occurred. Id. at 194-95. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7,
§ 297, at 855. The judge can examine any evidence, not only admissible evidence, be-
cause the rules of evidence do not generally apply to preliminary fact questions of admis-
sibility. Id. at 855 n. 11. See also FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
132. See Smith, 358 S.E.2d at 194-95; MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 297, at 855.
133. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 114. They noted, "One need not be a psycholo-
gist to distrust an observation made under emotional stress." Id. at 437. Further, they
cite two egregious examples of misperception. One was an excited witness to a horrible
accident who mistakenly declared that the coachman "deliberately and vindictively ran
down a helpless woman." Id. Another was a case of an upset man who testified that
"hundreds were killed in an accident [, and] he had seen their heads rolling from their
bodies." Id. Actually only one person was killed and five others were injured. Id. These
cases were used as illustrations not for the proposition that excited utterances be ex-
cluded, but rather that unexcited statements be admitted if relevant. Id. at 440.
134. For a recent application of this rule see, United States v. Badalamenti, 794 F.2d
821, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1986) (hearsay statement by informant to government agent that he
was willing to meet party at cafe to obtain heroin sample was admissible to show inform-
ant's future intent; moreover, statement could be connected to informant's subsequent
meeting with defendant because it was corroborated by independent evidence).
135. The present mental state exception is the most relevant subset of Rule 803(3) for
the purposes of this Note.
136. The present mental state exception of Rule 803(3) is also known as the Hillmon
doctrine. See infra note 140 for a discussion of the Hillmon case.
137. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 294, at 844. See Robinson v. State, 66 Md. App.
246, 261, 503 A.2d 725, 733 (1986) (hearsay statement not admitted under 803(3) because
declarant had opportunity to fabricate state of mind). Contra United States v. Lawal, 736
F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1984) (statements of declarant's then existing state of mind admissible
under Rule 803(3) even if self-serving and made under untrustworthy circumstances);
United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 271 (2d Cir. 1984) (same). For a comprehensive
overview of this area, see G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBERG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE
FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES § 58.3, at 68-74 (Supp. 1988).
138. See United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1987) (reservation in
Rule 803 excepts "a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed"). Thus, a statement of condition, "I'm scared", would be admissible, but a
statement of belief, "I'm scared because Galkin threatened me", would not. United States
v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir. 1980).
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ther, the trial judge has significant discretion to deny a statement's
admissibility under Rule 803(3) if a calculated misstatement is
probable. '3 9
The seminal case in this area is Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Hillmon. " The rule in Hillmon excepts from the operation of the
hearsay rule out-of-court statements of state of mind which tend to
prove a plan or intention of the declarant.' 4 ' The rationale support-
ing admission of statements of present mental state, based on res ges-
tae, 24 is similar to both Rules 803(1) and 803(2).143  Here the
declaration, however, is thought to be more valuable than testimony
in court.1" This exception was expressly included in Rule 803(3).145
One notable distinction from the present sense impression or the ex-
139. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 295, at 850; see also Commonwealth v. Davis, 308
Pa. Super. 398, 402-03, 454 A.2d 595, 597, (1982) (embodies common law principle by
requiring that statement tending to expose declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate
trustworthiness of statement). But see Smith v. Smith, 364 Pa. 1, 70 A.2d 630, 635 (1950)
(weight but not admissibility is influenced by self-serving nature of statement).
140. 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892). The case was an action on a life insurance policy. The
question was whether Hillmon had actually.died. A body had been found at Crooked
Creek, for which Hillmon had set out on March 5th. Plaintiff contended that Hillmon
and Brown were at Crooked Creek when Hillmon was accidentally shot. The insurance
company maintained that Walters had accompanied Hillmon, and that it was Walter's
body, not Hillmon's, that was found. A letter, from Walter to his sister, containing the
following statement, "I expect to leave ... on or about March 5th, with a certain Mr.
Hillmon . . ." was offered to show Walter's state of mind. Id. at 288. The inference
sought to be drawn was that it would thus be more probable that Hillmon was at
Crooked Creek. Id. at 295-96. For an in-depth look at the Hillmon case, see Maguire,
The Hillmon Case-Thirty-three Years After, 38 HARV. L. REV. 709 (1925).
141. Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 295-96. The Hillmon rule is limited to statements of future
intent. Statements of memory looking backwards in time do not fall within its purview.
Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 105-06 (1933).
142. See supra note 1.
143. Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 295. The language of the Hillmon court indicates a reliance
upon the nature of a person's state of mind as a guarantor of reliability. The Hillmon
court analogized to res gestae as follows:
[W]henever the intention is of itself a distinct and material fact in a chain of
circumstances, it may be proved by contemporaneous oral or written declara-
tions of the party. The existence of a particular intention in a certain person at
a certain time being a material fact to bi proved, evidence that he expressed that
intention at that time is as direct evidence of the fact, as his own testimony that
he then had that intention would be.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, this hearsay exception is actually a specific application of the
present sense impression exception. FED. R. EvID. 803(3) advisory committee's note. See
also Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - State of Mind to
Prove an Act, 38 YALE L.J. 283, 289 (1929).
144. Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 295. The declarant's "own memory of his state of mind at a
former time is no more likely to be clear and true than a bystander's recollection of what
he then said." Id.
145. The Hillmon rule "allowing evidence of intention as tending to prove the doing of
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cited utterance is that the declarant is in a unique position to perceive
his own mental state.
Attempts at adding other "additional qualifications" for admissibil-
ity of evidence under Rule 803(3) have been unsuccessful.146 This is
quite distinct from the requirement of corroboration advanced for
Rule 803(1).147 Courts have gone rather far in admitting hearsay
under Rule 803(3), 148 and there appears to be no reason why Rule
803(1) should bear an extra burden when this well accepted subclass
of the same rule does not.
C. Additional Strategies Directed at Decreasing the Usefulness of
the Present Sense Impression Exception
There are alternative methods to restrain the present sense impres-
sion exception to the hearsay rule that are in their nascent stages.
Two of these strategies involve legislative rather than judicial modifi-
cation to the exception found in the Federal Rules. 4
Originally, the New York Proposed Code of Evidence, 19 just as the
Federal Rules,'5 0 positioned the present sense impression among
those exceptions that require no showing of the declarant's unavaila-
.bility.l5 1 One commentator, however, suggested that the present
sense impression exception be included with the exceptions that first
the act intended, is, of course, left undisturbed." FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory commit-
tee's note.
146. See United States v. Harris, 733 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1984) (defendant
declarant's statement, "the Government was trying to set [me] up," should have been
admitted under state-of-mind exception 803(3)). In criminal cases, Hillmon statements
are admissible against a non-declarant when the statement is linked with independent
evidence that corroborates. United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1243 (1984). This requirement, however, only applies in criminal cases,
and it is not particularly onerous. See, e.g., United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294,
1325-26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 357 (1987). See supra note 9, for further discus-
sion of situations where extrinsic corroboration is appropriate.
147. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text for a description of the corrobora-
tion requirements of Rule 803(1).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 379-80 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1099. In Pheaster, the court allowed the state of mind of the declarant to
be used inferentially to prove that a meeting with the defendant actually took place. Sev-
eral statements to the effect that the declarant was going to "pick up a pound of mari-
juana which [defendant] had promised him for free" were admitted. Id. at 375-80. The
court held that it was permissible for the trier of fact to draw the inference that the
declarant actually carried out his intention, and met with the defendant. Id.
149. A Code of Evidence for the State of New York (proposed) (West 1980).
150. FED. R. EvID. 803(1).
151. McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 185 N.Y.L.J. 113, June 12, 1981, at 1, col.
1. This article was an influential one, for McLaughlin, now a Federal District Court
judge, chaired the New York State Law Revision Commission during the time both ver-
sions of the proposed code of evidence were drafted.
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require a showing of unavailability.'52 The next version of the New
York Code'53 contained just such an alteration. 5 4 This change ap-
pears to substitute a credibility test where admissibility is the issue.'1 5
The inevitable effect of such a modification would be to rob the pres-
ent sense impression of its vitality as an instrument for the admission
of evidence. '56
A related alternative means for emasculating the present sense im-
pression exception is to group it with the residual exceptions.' 57 This
too, however, seems inconsistent with the status of the other excep-
tions, 5 ' and should similarly be abandoned. There is no need to posi-
tion the present sense impression among the residual "catch-all"
exceptions. The present sense impression exception has specific crite-
ria governing its application.' 59 Placing this exception among the
more general residual exceptions would rob the hearsay rule of pre-
dictability and ease of use in cases of present sense impressions.
IV. Suggested Approach: A Consistent Method of Analysis
The Federal Rules of Evidence have attempted to supplant a case-
by-case approach for determining admissibility of evidence with a cat-
152. McLaughlin, supra note 151, at 1, col. 1. McLaughlin questioned the efficacy of
including the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule among those that do
not require an initial showing of unavailability. Further, he submitted that if the declar-
ant were available it made more sense to require that he be called, rather than rely on his
out-of-court statement. Id. A present sense impression, however, just as an excited utter-
ance or Hillmon statement, is deemed more useful than stale testimony in court. "The
theory of [this] group is that the out-of-court statement is at least as reliable as would be
his testimony in person, so that producing him would involve pointless delay and incon-
venience." MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 253, at 753 (emphasis added).
153. N.Y. CODE EVID. (Proposed Draft 1982).
154. N.Y. CODE EVID. 804(b)(1) (Proposed Draft 1982).
155. The theory behind the 804-type exceptions is that it is preferable to have live in-
court, albeit stale testimony. 'Only if the declarant is unavailable will the out-of-court
statement be accepted. Attacking the reliability of the present sense impression excep-
tion, by placing it in this category, while nurturing the exceptions with which it shares a
common foundation is inexplicable. The comments to the Proposed 1982 Code state only
that the displacement of the present sense impression "is more sensible, as the require-
ment of unavailability will ensure that the evidence is admitted only when truly neces-
sary." N.Y. CODE EVID. 804(b)(1) comment (Proposed Draft 1982).
156. Cf Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay. A Criticism of Present Law and the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1970) (disdaining the
res gestae exceptions as "an artifice for the admission of highly unreliable evidence which
is often the only type of evidence available"). Stewart argues that Rules 803(1), (2) and
(3) should require preference for the declarant's testimony in court, and should only be
used if the declarant is shown to be unavailable. Id. at 38.
157. See, e.g., Waltz I, supra note 24, at 22.
158. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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egorical one.'6° Federal Rules 803(1), (2) and (3) thus replace a baf-
fling amalgam of rationales which had existed under the rubric of res
gestae. 161 In probing the contours of these Rules, however, considera-
tion should be paid to their common origin in the res gestae doc-
trine. 16 2  Furthermore, Rules 803(2) and 803(3) do not advance
anything that might be called a corroboration requirement.
The benefits 163 served by the proper exercise of the often misapplied
res gestae doctrine can be satisfied by the Federal Rules and their state
counterparts. 164 Realization of these benefits, however, requires a re-
evaluation of current analysis, especially in states that have assailed
the reliability of the present sense impression. 165
It is important to note that the common origin that Rules 803(1),
(2) and (3) share in res gestae was criticized for its vague application,
not for its theoretical underpinnings. 66 This vagueness arose because
there were three separate exceptions grouped together, each with dis-
tinct guarantors of reliability. 67  The guarantors for each are now
codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence. The present sense impres-
sion exception should be applied as codified in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Unless there is a substantial showing that additional re-
160. See United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1984).
161. See supra note 1.
162. The remnants of res gestae that are codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence
803(1), (2), and (3), each have their own guarantors of reliability. The present sense im-
pression is that subset of res gestae which relies upon limitation in subject matter and near
contemporaneity. The declarant becomes a "conduit" for his sense impressions. The ex-
cited utterance relies upon excitement, and the resulting stilling of the declarant's reflec-
tive capacities. The present mental state exception depends for its reliability upon the
uniqueness of the declarant's perception of his own mental state. In each of these cases
the declaration forms part of the transaction or event it describes-so much a part that
the declaration is admitted via a hearsay exception. Requiring additional elements for
admission as a present sense impression, while admitting evidence admitted under hear-
say exceptions that have similar theoretical foundations is perplexing. See, e.g., infra
notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 7; infra note 188.
164. For instance, res gestae will permit the admission of a statement as evidence
before an exciting event has occurred. See, e.g., Hastings v. Ross, 211 Kan. 732, 734, 508
P.2d 514, 516 (1973) (statement of witness when she saw auto pass her house that, "that
boy is going to kill somebody one of these days," uttered prior to collision, would be
admissible as part of the res gestae). This same purpose would be served today by the
present sense impression exception.
165. Compare N.Y. CODE EVID. Rule 804(b)(1) (Proposed Draft 1982) with N.Y.
CODE EVID. Rule 803(1) (Proposed Draft 1980).
166. See FiSCH, supra note 2, § 1003, at 583-84. "Basically, the objections . . . are
aimed at [res gestae's] indeterminate meaiiing and indiscriminate use which have lead to
the confusion of the requirements of one hearsay exception with another and a conse-
quent exclusion of competent evidence." Id.
167. Id.
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quirements for admissibility are required, 168 such additional require-
ments should be abandoned. Thus, based on the rationale of res
gestae,'6 9 the requisite extrinsic support for a present sense impression
should be of the same quality as the other two exceptions. 170
Upon comparing the present sense impression and the excited ut-
terance exception, a curious and illogical calculus becomes apparent.
The lack of opportunity to effectively cross-examine is the primary
reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence.' 7 1 Cross-examination is
most often used to uncover inconsistencies in memory, perception and
narration. 72 Present sense impressions are regarded as most reliable
with respect to perception and memory, but may be questioned as to
their sincerity. 173 Conversely, excited utterances are thought to be
most reliable with respect to their sincerity, while of relatively ques-
tionable worth for their perception and memory. 74 Problems of nar-
168. See supra note 9, for discussion of a situation where extrinsic corroboration is
appropriate.
169. Robertson v. Hackensack Trust Co., 1 N.J. 304, 312, 63 A.2d 515, 519 (1949).
[T]he admissibility of the proofs as res gestae has as its justifying principle that
truth, like the Master's robe, is of one piece, without seam ... each fact ... and
the reproduction of a scene with its multiple incidents, each created naturally
and without artificiality and not too distant in point of time, will by very quality
and texture tend to disclose the truth.
Id. While this rationale is clear enough, it was the application of this theory that caused
problems. The modern approach of the Federal Rules with its categorical view of hear-
say exceptions eliminates most of these difficulties of application.
170. Today, however, we enjoy a categorized approach to these hearsay exceptions,
and "the law has now reached a stage at which widening admissibility will be best served
by other means. The ancient phrase [res gestae] can well be jettisoned, with due acknowl-
edgement that it served its era in the evolution of evidence law." MCCORMICK, supra note
7, § 288, at 836 (emphasis added).
171. The main reason for rejecting hearsay is an idea basic to the adversary system-
the adversary has a right that the jury shall riot be prejudiced by testimony which the
adversary has had no opportunity to cross-examine. See Hearsay Rule, supra note 7, at 4.
Thus, it is the lack of opportunity to effectively cross-examine that forms the basis of the
exclusionary rule. Where the usefulness of cross-examination is reduced ceteris paribus,
the support for excluding hearsay evidence is similarly reduced.
172. Hearsay Rule, supra note 7, at 4. While exposure of deliberate falsehood is the
most dramatic function of cross-examination, one needs only a brief experience in the
courtroom to learn that its more frequently and effectively exercised functions are to
bring to light faults in the perception, memory, and narration of the witnesses. Id.
173. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 965. "The closeness in time of statement to percep-
tion reduces memory problems to the de minimis level, and . . . there is ordinarily no
possibility of erroneous perception. But the ... infirmities of [narration] and insincerity
remain." Id.
174. See, e.g., Hilyer v. Howat Concrete Co., 578 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (statement
made by worker up to 45 minutes after fellow worker was run over by truck). Memory is
more likely to be a problem in excited utterances than present sense impressions because
of the greater period of time allowed between the event and the hearsay declaration. Id.
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ration are probably equal between the two.'75 Therefore, the lack of
opportunity for cross-examination is more damaging in cases of ex-
cited utterances, where there are inconsistencies of the type that cross-
examination corrects. This reasoning supports the view that present
sense impressions should be more easily admitted than excited
utterances. 1
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If we assume the existence of a corroboration requirement for ad-
mission of evidence as a present sense impression, it still is not clear
what has to be corroborated. Is it the substance of the declarant's
statement, as in Watson?177 Alternatively, is extrinsic evidence, i.e.,
corroboration, required only to establish that the statement was a
present sense impression? 178 The present sense impression exception
is a means to admissibility under the Federal Rules, and not a test of
credibility. 179 Credibility of these types of exclamations obviously af-
fected the development of the various categories of exceptions, but
now we have a categorical approach to ensure judicial economy con-
cerning questions of admissibility. '80 There is no theoretically sound
reason for 803(1) to have an additional corroboration requirement.
Proper care that the requirements of 803(1)181 are met, coupled with
the guarantees built into other sections of the Rules, 182 would ensure
that the present sense impression does not become overly "capa-
175. Tribe, supra note 14, at 965.
176. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 114. But see FED. R. EVID. 801. Rule 801
exempts non-assertive conduct from the definition of hearsay.
Admittedly evidence of [non-assertive conduct] is untested with respect to the
perception, memory, and narration (or their equivalents) of the actor, but the
Advisory Committee is of the view that these dangers are minimal in the ab-
sence of an intent to assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay
grounds. No class of evidence is free of the possibility of fabrication, but the
likelihood is less with nonverbal than with assertive verbal conduct.
Id. advisory committee's note.
177. People v. Watson, 109 Misc. 2d 71, 437 N.Y.S.2d 1016, rev'd, 100 A.D.2d 452,
474 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't), on remand, 127 Misc. 2d 439, 486 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1984).
178. Note that this is not an easy test to meet. See supra notes 62-64 and accompany-
ing text for the requirements for admission as a present sense impression.
179. United States v. Harris, 733 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1984). The general rule is
that if a statement comes within the requirements for a hearsay exception, except for the
residual and business records exceptions, it is admissible without any initial finding of
probable credibility. Id. Compare FED. R. EvID. 803(1) with FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
180. United States v. DiMaria 727 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1984). The categories in
Rules 803 and 804 all rest on the assumption that these types of statements bear special
guarantees of credibility. The method of the Federal Rules, however, is to determine that
issue by categories. If a statement falli within one of the exceptions it is admissible with-
out any preliminary finding of admissibility by the judge. Id.
18 1. The elements required for admission of evidence under the present sense impres-
sion exception are quite precise. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
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cious." ' 18 In fact, the present sense impression is significantly nar-
rower than the well accepted excited utterance exception, because a
present sense impression must' describe or explain the event, while an
excited utterance need only relate to the event. 184  If a statement
comes within the exception, and does not offend the other rules, it
should be admitted. 8 ' All three of these rules possess sufficient guar-
antees of trustworthiness within their contours such that an addi-
tional requirement of extrinsic corroboration is unnecessary. Casting
the present sense impression exception aside by adding an additional
element for admission has not been appropriately justified.
V. Conclusion
The purpose which res gestae served, that is, the admission of other-
wise inadmissible evidence, 8 6 was necessary even if the doctrine was
misapplied to the point of abuse. Res gestae may have been "a pass-
word for the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence,"1 87 but we
must also not allow "extrinsic corroboration" to become a password
for the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence. In many instances
hearsay evidence is the only evidence available, 8 and if the evidence
meets the requirements of an accepted hearsay exception it should be
admitted.'89 The present sense impression exception to the hearsay
rule should not be robbed of its utility.
William Gorman Passannante
183. Waltz I, supra note 24, at 23.
184. The scope of the subject matter of the present sense impression exception is more
circumscribed than that of the excited utterance exception. David v. Pueblo Supermarket,
740 F.2d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 1984). In Pueblo, a slip and fall case, the Third Circuit found
that the trial court had "reached the very outer bounds" of the excited utterance excep-
tion. Id. at 235. The statement, "I told them to clean it up about two hours ago...", was
admitted. The statement was related to the exciting event only insofar as it "concerned
the 'circumstances' surrounding the occurrence." Id. The statement did not, however,
"describe" the event and thus would not meet the more narrow subject matter require-
ment of the present sense impression. G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBERG, EVIDENCE IN
AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES § 58.3, at 63 (Supp. 1988); see supra
note 121 and accompanying text.
185. United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1984). Courts should con-
centrate on the elements for admission under the Federal Rules, and apply these elements
to the fact situations that come before them. See, e.g., Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 508
A.2d 976, 985 (1986) (court illustrates how it applied elements of present sense impres-
sion to facts as basis for admission of evidence)..
186. See, e.g., Hastings v. Ross, 211 Kan. 732, 734, 508 P.2d 514, 516 (1973).
187. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 288, at 836.
188. See Hearsay Rule, supra note 7. "[I]n many instances hearsay is better than noth-
ing, especially where its rejection will leave the litigants without evidence." Id. at 12.
189. United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1984).
